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Autonomous Vehicles (AVs) should reduce traffic accidents, but they will sometimes 
have to choose between two evils—for example, running over pedestrians or sacrificing 
itself and its passenger to save them. Defining the algorithms that will help AVs make 
these moral decisions is a formidable challenge. We found that participants to six MTurk 
studies approved of utilitarian AVs (that sacrifice their passengers for the greater good), 
and would like others to buy them; but they would themselves prefer to ride in AVs that 
protect their passengers at all costs. They would disapprove of enforcing utilitarian AVs, 
and would be less willing to buy such a regulated AV. Accordingly, regulating for 
utilitarian algorithms may paradoxically increase casualties by postponing the adoption of 
a safer technology. 
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The year 2007 saw the completion of the first benchmark test for autonomous driving in 
realistic urban environments [1, 2]. Since then, Autonomous Vehicles (AVs) such as the 
Google Car covered thousands of miles of real-road driving [3]. AVs promise world-
changing benefits, by increasing traffic efficiency [4], reducing pollution [5], and 
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eliminating up to 90% of traffic accidents [6]. Not all crashes will be avoided, though, 
and some crashes will require AVs to make difficult ethical decisions, in cases which 
involve unavoidable harm [7]. For example, the AV may avoid harming several 
pedestrians by swerving and sacrificing a passer-by, or  the AV may be faced with the 
choice of sacrificing its own passenger to save one or more pedestrians (Fig. 1). 
Although these scenarios appear unlikely, even low-probability events are bound to occur 
with millions of AVs on the road. Moreover, even if these situations were never to arise, 
programming must nevertheless include decision rules about what to do such in 
hypothetical situations. Thus these types of decisions need be made well before AVs 
become a global market. Distributing harm is a decision that is universally considered to 
fall within the moral domain [8, 9]. Accordingly, the algorithms that control AVs will 
need to embed moral principles guiding their decisions in situations of unavoidable harm 
[10]. Manufacturers and regulators will need to accomplish three potentially incompatible 
objectives: being consistent, not causing public outrage, and not discouraging buyers. 
However, pursuing these objectives may lead to moral inconsistencies. Consider for 
example the case displayed in Fig. 1a, and assume that the most common moral attitude 
is that the AV should swerve. This would fit a utilitarian moral doctrine [11], according to 
which the moral course of action is to minimize casualties. But consider then the case 
displayed in Fig. 1c. The utilitarian course of action, in that situation, would be for the AV 
to swerve and kill its passenger—but AVs programmed to follow this course of action 
might discourage buyers who believe their own safety should trump other considerations. 
Even though such situations may be exceedingly rare, their emotional saliency is likely to 
give them broad public exposure and a disproportionate weight in individual and public 
decisions about AVs. To align moral algorithms with human values, we must start a 
collective discussion about the ethics of AVs, that is, the moral algorithms that we are 
willing to accept as citizens and to be subjected to as car owners. Here we initiate the 
data-driven study of driverless car ethics, inspired by the methods of experimental ethics 
[12]. 
We conducted six online surveys between June and November 2015. All studies were 
programmed on Qualtrics survey software and recruited participants (USA residents only) 
from the Mechanical Turk platform, for a compensation of 25 cents. The experimental 
ethics literature largely relies on MTurk respondents, with robust results, even though 
Turk respondents are not necessarily representative of the US population [13,14]. A 
possible concern with MTurk studies is that some participants may already be familiar 
with testing materials, when these materials are used by many research groups; but this 
concern does not apply to our testing materials, which have never been used in a 
published MTurk study so far.
In all studies, participants provided basic demographic information. Regression analyses 
(see Supplementary online materials) showed that enthusiasm for self-driving cars was 
consistently greater for younger, male participants. Accordingly, all subsequent analyses 
included age and sex as covariates. The last item in every study was an easy question 
relative to the traffic situation that participants had just considered, e.g., how many 
pedestrians were on the road. Participants who failed this attention check (typically 10% 
of the sample) were discarded from subsequent analyses.
Detailed statistical results for all studies are provided in Supplementary online materials 
(Tables S1-S8). Overall, participants strongly agreed that it would be more moral for AVs 
to sacrifice their own passengers, when this sacrifice would save a greater number of lives 
overall.
In Study 1 (n = 182), 76% of participants thought that it would be more moral for AVs to 
sacrifice one passenger, rather than kill ten pedestrians (with a 95% confidence interval of 
69—82). These same participants were later asked to rate which was the most moral way 
to program AVs, on a scale from 0 (protect the passenger at all costs) to 100 (minimize 
the number of casualties). They overwhelmingly expressed a moral preference for 
utilitarian AVs programmed to minimize the number of casualties (median = 85, Fig. 2a). 
Participants were not quite so sure that AVs would be programmed that way though (67% 
thought so, with a median rating of 70). Thus, participants were not worried about AVs 
being too utilitarian, as often portrayed in science-fiction. If anything, they imagined 
future AVs as being less utilitarian than they should be. 
In Study 2 (n = 451), participants were presented with dilemmas that varied the number 
of pedestrians’ lives that could be saved, from 1 to 100. Participants did not think that 
AVs should sacrifice their passenger when only one pedestrian could be saved (with an 
average approval rate of 23%), but their moral approval increased with the number of 
lives that could be saved (p < 0.001) up to approval rates consistent with the 76% 
observed in Study 1 (Fig. 2b),. 
Participants’ approval of passenger sacrifice was even robust to treatments in which they 
had to imagine themselves and another person in the AV, a family member in particular 
(Study 3, n = 259). Imagining that a family member was in the AV negatively impacted 
the morality of the sacrifice, as compared to imagining oneself alone in the AV (p = 
0.003), but even in that strongly aversive situation, the morality of the sacrifice was still 
rated above the midpoint of the scale, with a 95% confidence interval of 54–66 (Fig. 3a). 
But this study presents the first hint of a social dilemma. On a scale of 1–100, 
respondents were asked to indicate how likely they would be to buy an AV programmed 
to minimize casualties (which would, in these circumstances, sacrifice them and their co-
rider family member), and how likely they would be to buy an AV programmed to 
prioritize protecting its passengers, even if it meant killing 10 or 20 pedestrians. Al- 
though the reported likelihood of buying an AV was low even for the self-protective 
option (median = 50), respondents indicated a significantly lower likelihood (p < .001) of 
buying the AV when they imagined the situation in which they and their family member 
would be sacrificed for the greater good (median = 19). In other words, even though 
participants still agreed that utilitarian AVs were the most moral, they preferred the self-
protective model for themselves. 
Study 4 (n = 267) offers another demonstration of this phenomenon. Participants were 
given 100 points to allocate between different types of algorithms, once to indicate how 
moral the algorithms were, once to indicate how comfortable they were for other AVs to 
be programmed that way, and once for how likely they would be to buy an AV 
programmed that way. For one of the algorithms, the AV would always swerve when it 
was about to run over people on the road. Fig 3b shows the points allocated to the AV 
equipped with this algorithm, in three situations: when it swerved into a pedestrian to 
save 10 people, when it killed its own passenger to save 10 people, and when it swerved 
into a pedestrian to save just one other pedestrian. The algorithm that swerved into one to 
save 10 always received many points, and the algorithm that swerved into one to save one 
always received few points. The algorithm that would kill its passenger to save 10 
presented a hybrid profile. Just as the high-valued algorithm, it received high marks for 
morality (median budget share = 50), and was considered a good algorithm for other 
people to have (median budget share = 50). But in terms of purchase intention, it received 
significantly fewer points than the high-valued algorithm (p < 0.001), and was in fact 
closer to the low-valued algorithms (median budget share = 33). Once more, it appears 
that people praise utilitarian, self-sacrificing AVs, and welcome them on the road, without 
actually wanting to buy one for themselves. 
This is the classic signature of a social dilemma, in which everyone has a temptation to 
free-ride instead of adopting the behavior that would lead to the best global outcome. One 
typical solution in this case is for regulators to enforce the behavior leading to the best 
global outcome; indeed, there are many other examples of tradeoff by people and 
governments that involve harm [15-17]. For example, some citizens object to regulations 
that require to immunize children before they start school, minimizing the perceived risk 
of harm to their child, while increasing the risk to others; and recognition of the threats of 
environmental degradation have prompted government regulations aimed at curtailing 
harmful behaviors for the greater good. But would people approve of government 
regulations imposing utilitarian algorithms in AVs, and would they be more likely to buy 
AVs under such a regulation? 
In Study 5 (n = 376), we asked participants about their attitudes towards legally enforcing 
utilitarian sacrifices. Participants considered scenarios in which either a human driver or a 
control algorithm had an opportunity to self-sacrifice in order to save 1 or 10 pedestrians 
(Fig 3c). As usual, the perceived morality of the sacrifice was high, and about the same 
whether the sacrifice was performed by a human or by an algorithm (median = 70). When 
asked whether they would agree to see such moral sacrifices legally enforced, their 
agreement was higher for algorithms than for human drivers (p < 0.002), but the average 
agreement still remained below the midpoint of the 0–100 scale in each scenario. 
Agreement was highest in the scenario where algorithms saved 10 lives, with a 95% 
confidence interval of 33–46. 
Finally, in Study 6 (n = 393), we asked participants specifically about their likelihood of 
purchasing the AVs whose algorithms had been regulated by the government. Participants 
were presented with scenarios in which they were either riding alone, with an unspecified 
family member, or with their child. As in the previous studies the scenarios depicted a 
situation in which the algorithm that controlled the AV could sacrifice its passengers to 
minimize casualties on the road. Participants indicated whether it was the duty of the 
government to take regulations that would minimize the casualties in such circumstances, 
whether they would consider the purchase of an AV under such a regulation, and whether 
they would consider purchasing an AV under no such regulation. As shown in Fig 3d, 
people were reluctant to accept governmental regulation of utilitarian AVs. Even in the 
most favorable condition, when they were only imagining themselves being sacrificed to 
save 10 pedestrians, the 95% confidence interval for whether people thought it was 
appropriate for the government to regulate this sacrifice was only 36–48. Finally and 
importantly, participants were vastly less likely to consider purchasing an AV with such 
regulation than without (p < 0.001). The median expressed likelihood of purchasing an 
unregulated AV was 59, compared to 21 for purchasing a regulated AV. This is a huge gap 
from a statistical perspective, but it must be understood as reflecting the state of public 
sentiment at the very beginning of a new public issue, and thus not guaranteed to persist.
Three groups may be able to decide how AVs handle ethical dilemmas: the consumers 
who buy the AVs; the manufacturers that must program the AVs in the first place; and the 
government which may regulate the kind of programming that manufacturers can offer 
and consumers can choose from. While manufacturers may engage in advertising and 
lobbying to influence the preferences of consumers and the regulations that the 
governments may pass, a critical collective problem consists of deciding whether 
governments should regulate the moral algorithms that manufacturers offer to consumers. 
Our findings suggests that regulation may be necessary, but at the same time counter- 
productive. Moral algorithms for AVs create a social dilemma [18, 19]. Even though 
people seem to agree that everyone would be better off if AVs were utilitarian (in the 
sense of minimizing the number of casualties on the road), they all have a personal 
incentive to ride in AVs that will protect them at all costs. Accordingly, if both self-
protective and utilitarian AVs were allowed on the market, few would be willing to ride in 
utilitarian AVs, even though they would prefer others to do so. Regulation may provide a 
solution to this problem, but it faces two difficulties. First, most people seem to 
disapprove of a regulation that would enforce utilitarian AVs. Second and worse, our 
results suggest that such a regulation could significantly delay the adoption of AVs—
which means that the lives saved by making AVs utilitarian may be outnumbered by the 
deaths caused by delaying the adoption of the AVs altogether, with their other safety 
enhancing technologies. This is a challenge that should be on the mind of carmakers and 
regulators alike. 
Moral algorithms for AVs will need to tackle more intricate decisions than that we have 
considered in our surveys. For example, our scenarios did not feature any uncertainty 
about decision outcomes, but a collective discussion about moral algorithms will have to 
tackle the concepts of expected risk, expected value, and blame assignment. Is it 
acceptable for an AV to avoid a motorcycle by swerving into a wall, considering that the 
probability of survival is greater for the passenger of the AV, than for the rider of the 
motorcycle? Should AVs take the ages of the passengers and pedestrians into account 
[20]? If a manufacturer offers different versions of its moral algorithm, and a buyer 
knowingly chose one of them, is the buyer to blame for the harmful consequences of the 
algorithm’s decisions? Such liability considerations will need to accompany existing 
discussions of regulation [21], and we hope that psychological studies inspired by our 
own will be able to inform this discussion.
Figuring out how to build ethical autonomous machines is one of the thorniest challenges 
in artificial intelligence today [22]. As we are about to endow millions of vehicles with 
autonomy, taking algorithmic morality seriously has never been more urgent. Our data-
driven approach highlights how the field of experimental ethics can give us key insights 
into the moral, cultural and legal standards that people expect from autonomous driving 
algorithms. For the time being, there seems to be no easy way to design algorithms that 
would reconcile moral values and personal self-interest, let alone across different cultures 
with different moral attitudes to life-life tradeoffs [23]—but public opinion and social 
pressure may very well shift as this conversation progresses. 
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Figure 1: Three traffic situations involving imminent unavoidable harm. The car must 
decide between (a) killing several pedestrians or one passer by, (b) killing one pedestrian 
or killing its own passenger, (c) killing several pedestrians or killing its own passenger. 
Figure 2: Considering the greater good vs the life of the passenger. In studies 1 and 2, 
when asked which would be the most moral way to program AVs, participants expressed 
a preference for AVs programmed to kill their passenger for the greater good. This 
preference was strong as soon as 5 lives or more could be saved (left panel shows 
detailed results for 10 lives). On average, participants were more confident that AVs 
should pursue the greater good than they were confident that AVs would be programmed 
to do so. Boxes show the 95% confidence interval of the mean. 
Fig.  3: Towards regulation and purchase (studies 3-6). Boxes show the 95% confidence 
interval of the mean. In all studies, participants expressed a moral preference for AVs 
sacrificing their passengers to save a greater number of pedestrians. This moral 
preference was robust to situations in which participants imagined themselves in the AV 
in the company of a coworker, a family member, or their own child. However, (a and b) 
participants did not ex- press a comparable preference for buying utilitarian AVs, 
especially when they thought of family members riding in the car, and (c and d) they 
disapproved of regulations enforcing utilitarian algorithms for AVs, and indicated that 
they would be less likely to purchase an AV under such a regulation. 
a b cSWERVE STAYSWERVE STAYSWERVE STAYWERVE STAYSWERVE STAY
020
40
60
0
20
40
60
W
h
a
t
 
w
i
l
l
 
A
V
s
 
d
o
?
W
h
a
t
 
s
h
o
u
l
d
 
A
V
s
 
d
o
?
0 25 50 75 100
From 0 = 'Protect driver at all costs' 
to 100 = 'Minimize casualties on the road'
Nu
m
be
r o
f R
es
po
ns
es
Study 1A
0.25
0.50
0.75
1 2 5 20 100
Number of lives saved by sacrifice
Pr
op
or
tio
n 
wh
o 
ag
re
e
Will AVs sacrifice? Should AVs sacrifice?
Study 2BStudy 1 Study 2
20
40
60
80
Morality
of sacrifice
Buy
Minimize
Buy
Protective
Ag
re
em
en
t w
ith
 M
or
ali
ty
(o
r) 
W
illi
ng
ne
ss
 to
 B
uy
Alone with Coworker with Family
Study 3a
20
40
60
80
Morality
of Sacrifice
Wants this
for other cars
Wants this
for my car
Bu
dg
et
 S
ha
re
Kill Pedestrian
to Save Ten
Kill Passenger
to Save Ten
Kill Pedestrian
to Save One
Study 4b
20
40
60
80
Morality
of Sacrifice
Legally
Enforce Sacrifice
Ag
re
em
en
t w
ith
 M
or
ali
ty
(o
r) 
Ag
re
em
en
t w
ith
 L
eg
al 
En
fo
rc
em
en
t
Human
Saves One
Algorithm
Saves One
Human
Saves Ten
Algorithm
Saves Ten
Study 5c
20
40
60
80
Morality
of Sacrifice
Regulated
Sacrifice
Purchase if
regulated
Purchase if
not regulated
Ag
re
em
en
t w
ith
 M
or
ali
ty 
an
d 
Re
gu
lat
ion
(o
r) 
W
illi
ng
ne
ss
 to
 P
ur
ch
as
e
Alone with Family with own Child
Study 6d
